Joint Bank Accounts -- Joint Tenancy -- Survivorship by Palmer, Dean W.
LAW JOURNAL - DECEMBER, 1941
that policies of fire insurance shall run with the land'7 and be paid
as interest may appear; where the vendor insures prior to the contract
of sale, such insurance shall continue on the property until expressly
cancelled by the insurer. It is realized that such a provision modify-
ing the statutory forms of insurance policies will be fought strenu-
ously by the insurer in the several state legislatures.' Such opposi-
tion has been encountered and defeated on previous occasions."
Whether it be called convenience, 20 universal consensus of man-
kind,21 business man's viewpoint,2 2 or natural justice, 23 the layman as-
sumes that an executory contract for the sale of insured realty carries
the protection of existing insurance to the purchaser. If that is the
meaning in the market place, that should also be the meaning in the
court room." This can be accomplished most effectively by legisla-
tive enactment.
R. W. C.
JOINT TENANCY
JOINT BANK ACCOUNTS-JOINT TENANCY-
SURVIVORSHIP
F, by letter, directed her Building and Loan Association to with-
draw $i8oo.oo from her savings account and deposit it in a separate
account, issuing therefor a certificate of deposit in the names of "F
or S or suvivor," the certificate to be placed in her deposit passbook.
then in the hands of the association; S to be notified of the arrange-
ment only if she survived F. The Ohio Court of Appeals, upon re-
versing the trial court's judgment for the executor, because of con-
flict certified the record to the Supreme Court. Held, affirmed, the
court reasoning that at the moment the company carried out the in-
structions of F, an executed contract arose between the company
and F, enforceable by S with the attendant incident of survivor-
17 Vance, 34 YALr L. J. 87.
18A somewhat similar amendment to the Uniform Vendor and Purchaser Risk Act
was withdrawn for that reason. 44th Annual Meeting National Conference on Uniform
State Laws. Milwaukee, Wisconsin, 1934.
1Notably incontestible clause in life insurance policies.
$1 RicsARns, INSURANCE (4th Ed.) 1932, sec. 245.
'James dissenting in Rayner v. Preston, L. R. 18 Ch. Div. (Eng.) 1 (1881).
2 Vanneman, 3 MiNN. L. REv. 139.
2Ileadnote in Stent v. Bailis, 2 P. WVMS. (Eng.) 217 (1724).
SVance, 34 YALE L. J. 90.
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ship. Rhorbacker v. Building and Loan Assit., i38 Ohio St. 273
(1941).
The problem of finding a transfer of a present interest in the
co-depositor is the same whether the court regards the parties as
joint tenants or tenants in common.' Transfer of title by inter vivos
gift requires that the donor must have an intention to create a pres-
ent and immediate interest in the donee, and that he must make such
delivery of the subject-matter of the gift as to place it in the im-
mediate possession and control of the donee.2  To sustain a present
interest in the noncontributing depositor on a trust theory, most
courts require a declaration of the trust together with some act
which evidences a transfer of the equitable interest from the set-
tlor.1 The trust theory has been severely criticized inasmuch as it
is difficult to find both of these elements present in any one case. 4
An increasing number of courts hold that a present interest in the
fund is conveyed to the other person by the contract of deposit,
which not only indicates the creator's intention but also performs the
function of delivery." \Vhere the fund is contributed by both par-
ties, the contract between them not only indicates the creators' in-
tention but also satisfies the requisite delivery. In every instance
where one person furnishes the entire fund, the enforceable contract
is necessarily between the depositor and the financial institution. The
intention to create a present interest can be found as in the first
situation, while the contractual rights thereby raised in the donee-
beneficiary symbolize the requisite delivery.7
After a present interest has been found in the co-depositor, the
question then becomes one as to the character of that interest. It
is well recognized that personal property is susceptible of being held
by two or more parties with the right of survivorship.8 It is this
right, as a natural incident of the tenancy. which distinguishes joint
N\artin. 71o lc d 'z 'q S,'r-o-ship in Ohio (1937) 3 Oio ST. L. J. 48, 60.
2Brow';. PrUON:AL Pir OnrV (1936) 75; Rice v. Bennington County Say. Bank, 93
Vi. 493, 108 Atl. 703 (1920), 48 A. L. R. 189, 191.
-Howard v. Dinj1uy. 122 MXe. 5. 118 Atl. 592 (1922).
Roowl.ky, Liv:ing Testame;ztar'g Dispositions (1935) 3 U. or CmN. L. R. 361, 378-389.
mNotes: 40 A. L. R. 189; 66 A. L. R. 881; 103 A. L. R. 1123.
O Perry v. Leveroni, 252 Mass. 390, 147 N. E. 826 (1925).
Kauf jw Jvrsy Title & Trust Co. v. Archibald, 92 N. J. Eq. 82, 108 At. 434 (1919);Kaufman v. Edwards, 92 N'. J. Eq. 554, 113 Aft. 598 (1921); Battles v. Millbury Say.
Bank, 250 'Mass. 180, 145 N. E. S5 (1924); In re Stover ,218 Wis. 114, 260 X. W.
655 (1935); Hemingway, Joint lcancy in Joint Ban:? Accounts (1931) 10 CHIC.KZXT
Prv. 37; Note: 3 U. or CiN. L. Rrv. 310 (1935).
SrvOtTLrYt, PrPSONAL PPO~rRT" (5th ed.) 222 et seq.
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tenancy from tenancy in connon.9 Whether one or the other is
created depends upon the intention of the original depositor or de-
positors. The power to withdraw the whole fund, and thereby ex-
tinguish the account,1 and even the retention of the power of revoca-
tion by the creator of the fund," have been held not to be incon-
sistent with joint tenancy in joint accounts, and should not prevent
such ownership from arising. Evidences of an intention that the
parties were to own the property as joint tenants should be enough
to give rise to joint tenancy. "12 Thus, if there are acts sufficient to
transfer a present interest to the co-depositor, and if there is a clear
intention that the property is to be jointly owned by the parties with
the right of survivorship, the courts in most jurisdictions hold that
a joint tenancy arises.' 3
This analysis of joint tenancy in joint funds appears to have been
accepted by the Supreme Court of Ohio in Clcveland Trust Co. v.
Scobie; * the court apparently held there that the survivor took the
fund because of the interest created by the contract, reasoning that
by means of the contract the depositor of the fund created in his
co-depositor an interest equal to his own.
The later case of it re Hutchnson,'r however, reinvoked the at-
OTirrANY, R ,AL PROPERTY, (3rd ed. 1939) 195. Traditionally the courts have said
that before a joint tenancy may arise there must exist the four unities of interest, title.
time and possession. The insistence by the courts on these unities seems to arise from a
misunderstanding of the original use of the words. At their best they are a means of
explaining the relation of the parties in the joint tenancy rather than requirements which
must exist before the tenancy arises. CHALLIS, REAL PROPERTY *367. It is to be noticed
at this point that the joint tenancy with the natural incident of survivorship has not been
abolished by statute in Ohio. In re Hutchinson Estate, 120 Ohio St. 542, 552 (1929s.
Although survivorship is also a natural incident of tenancy by the entireties, this type of
concurrent ownership is to be distinguished from joint tenancy in that it only exists
where the parties are husband and wife.10Kennedy v. Kennedy, 169 Cal. 287, 147 Pac. 647 (1915); McLeod v. Hennepin
County Say. Bank, 145 Minn. 299, 176 N. W. 987 (1920); Blick v. Cockins, 262 Pa. 56.
87 Ati. 125 (1926). But see Bowerman, Adnmx. v. Bowerman, 67 Ohio App. 425. 42S
(1941), however the right of survivorship was sustained on a different ground.
"Kaufman v. Edwards, 92 N. 3. Eq. 554, 113 Atl. 598 (1921).
I'Hemingway, JOINT TE7NANCY IN JOINT BANE ACCOUNTS, (1931) 10 CNIC-KBNT
REv. 37, 68.
35Notes: (1934) 22 CALIF. L. Rev. 450; (1940) 28 CALIF. L. Rev. 224; (1930) 19 Gzo.
L. J. 100; (1924) 37 HARv. L. REv. "v; (1025 )8 HAav. L. R. 243; (1927) 26 *MIcn.
L. RE V. 220; (1940) 38 Mics. L. REv. 875; (1930) ST. JorN's L. Rzv. 116; (1932) 17
ST. Louis L. Rev. 366; (1939) OHIo ST. L. J. 191; (1928) 78 U. or PA. L. Rav. 1002;
(1938) 36 YALE L. J. 138; 48 A. L. R. 189; 66 A. L. R_ 881; 103 A. L. R. 1123.
t'114 Ohio St. 241 (1926).
15 120 Ohio St. 542 (1929). Accord: Berberick v. Courtade, 137 Ohio St. 297, 2,'
N. E. (2d) 636 (1937); Sage v. Flueck, 132 Ohio St. 377, 7 N. E. (2d) 802 (1936):
Oleff v. Hodapple, 29 Ohio St. 432, 195 N. E. 838, 98 A. L. R. 764 (1935).
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titude of the Ohio courts, which had prevailed prior to the Scobie
decision.1'3 that the right of the survivor arises from the contract and
not as an incident of demonstrated joint tenancy. Cases like the
principal one which adhere more to the Hutchinson view stress the
contract as a technical requirement for the finding of joint tenancy;
they have not considered the contractor's function as a vehicle for
transferring an interest to the transferee, whether in joint tenancy
or otherwise. This unique approach, while it does not preclude cor-
rect judicial disposal of many of the situations litigated, can easily
lead to erroneous decisions in two classes of cases: (i) the denial
(f the right of survivorship where no contract is present in the trans-
action, even though a present interest has been created and the in-
tention is clear that the property was to be owned by the parties as
joint tenants: (2) the finding of the incident of survivorship where
no present interest was in fact created. That such possibilities are
morc than academic the present case itself bears witness, for the
evidence seems to indicate that F intended to make a testamentary
disposition of her money rather than to transfer a present interest
in it to S. Such a transaction fails as not fulfilling the requirements
of the statute of wills. 1 7  Even if this was not the intention of F,
still there are a great number of courts which hold that a present
interest is not created where, as here, the co-depositor does not have
the right of withdrawal during the life time of the depositor."
D. W. P.
2 In an carl real property case, Lc .is v. Bardwin, 11 Ohio 352 (1842), the court
-aid that the .urvivor held title, uot upwi the principle of "urvivorship as an incident
,4f J,,int tenncy, but as grantee in fee, as survivor, by the operative words of the deed.
Ilhe -,ed of this concept is to be found in an earlier Ohio case, Sorgent v. Steinberger,
2 Ohio 305, 15 Am. Dec. 553 (126). The Ohio cases are discussed and collected in
"Iartin, supra, note I, at 60 n.
11 Onto G. C. §10504-3.
"Notct'- 4S A. L. R. 198; 66 A. L. R. P,%6; 103 A. L. R. 1129.
